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PROCEDURE.-
SERVICE OF PROCESS UPON NON-RESIDENT MOTOR VEHICLE OPERATORS
The following is a brief version of Virginia Code, Section 2154 (70)i:
The acceptance by a non-resident of the privilege conferred upon
him in permitting him to operate a motor vehicle in this state shall
operate to appoint the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles as his
agent for the service of process, and such service shall have the same
legal effect as service upon his person for acts arising out of the opera-
tion of such vehicle - provided that the Director mails to the defendant
by registered mail a copy of the process with registered delivery receipt
requested.
The constitutionality of the statute can no longer be seriously
questioned. (1) The constitutional requirements of notice are met by the
provision that "the Director mail the notice to the defendant by regis-
tered mail with return receipt requested. (2) Whether omission of.the
provision requesting a' return receipt" would alter the validity of the
statute has not been fully answered - though one case held that it would
not. The question still open for discussion is "what constitutes a
sufficient compliance with the Statute?" Do the words "to the defendant"
mean that the defendant must actually receivo the notice?
A conservative Georgia Court held that though the Statute was complied
with the Court did not have personal jurisdiction because the notice was
not received by the defendant. (3) The applicable Statute in Georgia
is similar to the Virginia Statute. In effect, the Georgia court held
that the defendant either had to receive the notice, or know that it was
in the post office for him. The Court based their decisionion the prin-
ciple that "the Statute was in derogation of the comnon law and must be
strictly construed." (Statutes providing for service upon non-resident
motorist mdst be strictly construedi)(4) The Coutts which have taken the
"strict construction" or conservative view have all used the same
reasoning as did the Georgia court, a reasoning which did not carry out
the intention of the Legislature or the spirit of the Statute.
The liberal view is oxnressed in the holding of a Texas Cgurt that
a non-resident motorist by operating a vehicle in the State of Texas by
such act submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court and consents
to be sued in the courts of that state. (5) Service under the Pennsyl-
vania Statute was held valid even though the vehicle at the time of the
accident was on a private road. (6) The rationale is that the inherent
danger connected with automobiles is not restricted to public highways.
This decision expresses the tendency of a majority of the Courts.
Proceeding from the principle in the latter case we find two 
tests
have been laid down, one of "reasonable probability" (7) and the other
of "best practicablc notice". (8) Whether the two tests are different is
an open question*
In a leading and recent case (9) the Court, in upholding service
under the Virginia Statute, stated, "it will be presumed that the
Director will exercise reasonable discretion, and if facts upon 
inquiry
indicate that the address furnished is one from which it is probable
that delivery will be made, service shall be held good." Whether or notit was probable that the defendant actually received notice in this caseis a somewhat different question from whether or not the Director acted
reasonably in view of the facts before him. The defendant in the case
was the wife of an enlisted man in the Navy. Facts tended to §how that
she had very little contact with any of the places to which the Director
mailed the notice, She was obviously a transient and inclined to verylittle contact with any home ties. The likelihood of her receiving notice
und6r such circumstances is distinctly different from whether the Director
acted reasonably in view of the information available to him. The
Director did mail a notice to each of the addresses. he could obtain re-
specting the defendant. Certainly such was reasonable and the best
practicable notice. The defendant did enter a special appearance, in-dicating that in some way she received notice, but this shopld be imma-
terial in deciding whether the Statute has been complied with. In effect,this case holds that if the Director mails the notice to the best available
address or one most likely to reach thc. defendant, service will be held
good. In view of this we do not need to argue about "probability".
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